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‘Being There’ or ‘Being Ross Garnaut’? 
The changing fortunes of a policy entrepreneur1 
 
Few people, inside or outside government, have had a greater impact on public 
policy in Australia than Professor Ross Garnaut. The author a number of major 
reports for government, he has helped to shape the public policy response to both 
Australia’s growing economic relationship with northeast Asia as well as the even 
more contentious challenge of climate change. It is not necessary to agree with his 
analysis of either of these issues, or his recommendations, to recognize that Garnaut 
has done more than most people in this country to define the terms, if not the 
outcome, of these debates. Whether one describes Garnaut as a ‘public intellectual’ 
or a ‘policy entrepreneur’, he has  exerted a powerful influence over Australian 
public policy over two very different issue areas. 
 
Why did Garnaut’s reports on economic ‘engagement’ and climate change 
have such very different receptions? Why was Australia and the Northeast Asian 
Ascendancy (ANAA) greeted with widespread acclaim and largely adopted as the 
basis of bipartisan policy in the years that followed, whereas the Garnaut Climate 
Change Review (GCGR 2008) and his follow-up report, the Garnaut Review 2011 
(GR 2011), have proved much more contentious? Even though elements of GCGR 
2008 and GR 2011have been adopted by the Gillard government in the form of a 
carbon tax, such policies have proved highly contentious and been opposed 
vehemently by the Liberal-National Party coalition under the leadership of Tony 
Abbott (2011).  
 
We start to explain this puzzle by drawing initially on John Kingdon’s 
‘Multiple Streams’ model of the policy process. It is a good starting point when 
trying and to identify some of the factors which facilitate or obstruct the influence 
and impact of ‘policy entrepreneurs’.  However, we also argue we need to look at the 
wider domestic and international political context that allows some individuals, or 
organizations, to influence the policy agenda. When the political context is not 
conducive, even possession of what are widely accepted to be ‘the facts’ may not 
prove sufficient to win the policy debate. We illustrate this claim by looking at the 
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specific political dynamics that obtained when Garnaut’s reports on economic 
engagement and climate change were produced. Our comparison across time allows 
us to consider whether it is policy entrepreneurship, the issue itself or the political 
and institutional context that is decisive. 
 
Our title draws on two Hollywood films to posit different dynamics of 
structure and agency. In Being There, a simple-minded gardener walks into the real 
world in the clothes of his wealthy deceased benefactor. Through a series of 
accidents, this man is mistaken as Chauncey Gardiner - an upper class, educated and 
penetratingly insightful businessman. A further series of misinterpretations in this 
satire sees him elevated as economic policy advisor to the US President. Conversely, 
Being John Malkovich is theatre of the absurd whereby the central character, an out-
of-work puppeteer, discovers a portal into the mind and bodily experience of 
Malkovich.  Although the intended illogicality of the plot could be taken as a 
metaphor of the multiple streams non-linear policy processes, of greater relevance to 
this paper is the primacy given to celebrity (or expertise).  ‘Being Ross Garnaut’ 
casts the policy entrepreneur as central whereas ‘Being There’ puts entrepreneurship 






The phrase ‘policy entrepreneur’ has entered the popular lexicon, but the idea 
has yet to be systematically integrated into theories of policy change (Mintrom and 
Norman 2009: 650). John Kingdon was one of the first scholars to coin the term, 
‘policy entrepreneur’, and it can be usefully distinguished from ‘public intellectual’. 
In brief, public intellectuals (PI) are people who will ‘opine on a wide array of 
issues, are generalists rather than specialists, concern themselves with matters of 
interest to the public at large, and do not keep their views to themselves’ (Etzioni 
2006: 1). Alternatively, policy entrepreneurship “refers to the actions, behaviour and 
qualities of dynamic policy actors in pursuit of policy change” (Mackenzie, 2004: 
368).  Consequently, there can be considerable overlap between the idea of policy 




One key difference between the two ideas is the focus on ‘the public’. The PI 
is more likely to based in, or speaking from, civil society or outside the formal 
institutions of governance, quite often a university, and is someone who is able “to 
find or cultivate a broad audience” (Howe 2006: 36). By contrast, the policy 
entrepreneur is just as likely to be working within the architecture of the state, 
sometimes behind-the-scenes and not necessarily seeking to be engaged with public 
discourse. Instead, they target decision making elites in political parties, government, 
corporate offices or the key players and interests in policy communities. Moreover, a 
‘policy entrepreneur’ is likely to stick to their general area of expertise when 
engaging the policy process and/or public debate and not opine on all matters of 
public concern. A second difference is that policy entrepreneurship can originate 
from organisations such as a qango or think-tank (Stone 2007), from policy networks 
(Hoeijmakers et al, 2007) and that a new policy narrative can have many authors 
(Henry 2007: 93).  
 
Agendas and Policy Processes 
Kingdon’s model of the policy process rests on the notion that the political 
system consists of the coordination and confluence of three relatively independent 
“streams” of decision making: problems, politics, and policies:  The problem stream 
represents the series of conditions requiring public attention. The policy stream 
represents the series of concrete policy proposals that may address actual or potential 
problems. Problems and policies are both identified and championed by participants 
in the system. The “politics” stream then represents the general policy environment 
and decision-making opportunities. This latter aspect has been pivotal in our case 
study and has been relatively neglected in the policy studies literature (also 
Mackenzie 2004: 372).  
 
Actors who promote specific solutions are labeled policy entrepreneurs. 
Usually based in the policy stream, they ‘chase’ problems with their policy 
recommendations; that is, ‘solutions chase problems’. Sometimes, they take 
advantage of disruptions in the political system, or of emerging problems, to merge 
the streams. When these streams couple, a ‘policy window’ opens which may 




The problem stream develops through processes of mobilization and issue 
definition – often characterized in pluralist terms. The problem stream is 
characterized by dramatic focusing events that grab the attention of both the public 
and policymakers. They are relatively rare sudden events that cause great damage 
and foretell of greater future damage. Generally such events are concentrated to a 
particular geographical area or community of interest.  Alternatively, policymakers 
become aware of problems through feedback on existing policy. Often this is 
negative feedback generated by evaluation studies, target groups, bureaucrats or 
policymakers themselves, who report on what is not working or on the unintended 
consequences of policies (Pralle 2009: 784-85). Issues gradually develop into a 
problem.  
 
The policy stream represents various attempts to provide solutions to one or 
more public problems. This stream contains competing proposals for new policies or 
amendments of existing policies as well as processes for eliminating normatively 
and pragmatically unviable policies.  In other words, the policy stream develops 
based on rules of natural selection of policies – often subject to elite pressures of a 
narrow policy community. Various specialized participants champion specific policy 
proposals that may be applied to a variety of public problems. The capacity of policy 
entrepreneurs to secure the coordination of different policy circles or departments to 
a specific solution or policy package is usually crucial.   
 
The politics stream flows and ebbs on ideological and institutional 
characteristics of the policy system, reflecting changes in ‘the national mood’, the 
influence of public campaigns of interest groups, ‘administrative or legislative 
turnovers’ and changes of allegiances of politicians within parliaments. Changes can 
enable or disable the advance of proposals to the political agenda. Elections bring 
new participants into the policy process and provide deadlines for policy choices. 
 
In sum, only when a prominent problem can be linked to a viable policy 
consistent with national mood at a time when elected officials can make a decision 
will new policies emerge. Kingdon made little effort to explain when this 
convergence will happen. He also had little to say as to whether the subject matter of 
the issue itself could be a critical factor. However, our case studies suggest that if we 
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want to account for differences in outcomes involving the same policy entrepreneur, 
the specific issue is at least part of the explanation and needs to be added to 
Kingdom’s schema.  As we suggest below, the positive reception of the Garnaut 
Report on integration with Asia reflected a convergence of all three streams.  By 
contrast, the Climate Change Reviews did not bring a convergence with the political 
stream and the specific issue area proved much more contentious.  
 
Was (in)effective policy entrepreneurship the critical explanatory factor in 
each case?  Or, as we suggest, did the substance of the issue in each case also have a 
bearing? Specifically, ANAA represented a culmination and consolidation of 
consensus forming via Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC – Woods 1993), venues where Garnaut had 
long-standing expert status. This was an area of direct national policy interest and in 
which sovereign decision making could make a difference. By contrast, the Climate 
Reviews represent the initiation of new policies in an intractable issue area that had 
been politicized by the media and political parties, where Garnaut was criticized for 
not being a climate scientist. Adding a further layer of complexity was the fact that 
climate change is a global issue not amenable to sovereign control of one state. 
Perceptions of national costs to Australians and benefits to others meant that the 
‘national mood’ assumed greater prominence in this issue area.   
 
One of the key reasons why some policy entrepreneurs are able to influence 
policy is because they have significant personal resources. Such resources can be a 
mix of epistemic authority (such as that held by economists), former government 
service or policy experience in the field. Equally, importantly, policy-entrepreneurs 
have ‘political connections or negotiating skills, implying a combination of technical 
expertise and political know-how’ as well as ‘sheer persistence’  and willingness  ‘to 
invest large resources in order to promote their solutions’ (Gulbrandsson & Fossum, 
2009: 435).  They function as an ‘issue initiator,’ ‘policy broker’ and ‘strategist’ 
(Skok, 1995).  Even this combination of connectedness, personal qualities and dogged 
determination may prove ineffective if the ‘political arena’ is not receptive. 
 
The art of the policy entrepreneur also includes their skills of political 
persuasion, and of bringing different peoples together. Informal networks and 
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professional associations are made influential by the policy entrepreneurs operating 
within them.  The effectiveness of ANAA was enhanced by the long term consensus 
building activities among a community of Australian business people, economists and 
government officials who interacted with their Asian counterparts as well as in 
Australian venues mentioned below. It is important to the political and economic 
resonance of ANAA (unlike the Climate Reviews), as this professional community 
helped cultivate a positive atmosphere for policy change.    
  
An over-simple application of policy entrepreneurship holds “a danger that 
attention is drawn to official policy entrepreneur such as chief executives, or other 
prominent politicians… (when) in reality there may be several people working 
together in the policy process” (Oborn, Barrett & Exworthy 2011: 328). Indeed, 
Garnaut was only one actor in the broader regional policy community. In other words, 
the key explanatory factor may not be the individual agent. A more sophisticated 
application of this approach suggests that the key explanatory factor may be found 
elsewhere in “a temporal conjunction of separate sub-policy processes: ‘agenda 
setting, alternative–specification, and decision making’” (Ackrill and Kay 2011: 72; 
and Skok, 1995: 326).   
 
This turns agent centred explanation on its head by suggesting that the 
entrepreneur merely happens to be ‘in the right place, at the right time’, not unlike 
Chauncey Gardiner.  Equally important, however, it is possible to be in possession of 
brilliant ideas at the wrong time, and persuasiveness, expertise and epistemic 
authority may count for little—or be so politicised as to be effectively undermined. 
Agency is clearly important, but even the most credible and energetic individuals may 
be unable to counteract the influence of what the Australian Treasurer Wayne Swan 
(2012) describes as politically and economic powerful ‘vested interests’. More so than 
Kingdon, we emphasise that the character of an issue, and the way it’s managed in the 
political stream, can be of critical consideration.  
 
 




In addition to his stints as prime ministerial adviser, Ross Garnaut was also 
ambassador to China, held numerous senior academic and public policy-oriented 
roles, not to mention running a gold-mining company in his spare time. Today, 
Garnaut is recognized as one of Australia’s leading neoclassical economists. Even at 
this stage it is worth asking the counterfactual: if Garnaut hadn’t been around, would 
it have made any difference? Would circumstances and necessity have eventually 
conspired to produce another figure or actors that might have championed similar 
ideas? Deciding quite how much to attribute to agency and how much towards 
facilitating structural conditions is a crucial but unresolved theoretical issue (Bell 
2011).  
 
What we can say is that having decided to become an economist, it made a 
difference that Garnaut chose to study at the Australia National University. The ANU 
is not only Australia’s most significant concentration of scholarship, but it was, and 
perhaps remains, the bearer of a particular ethos as far as public service is concerned. 
Such values are not to be underestimated as determinants of world views, orientations 
to public policy and the potential contribution of experts. As Garnaut points out: 
 
Nugget Coombs would call the economists of Australia to a meeting in his office to 
talk about some policy issue in the ’50s, and so they interacted with each other rather 
intensively. And most of them had academic bases. But today the great bulk of 
economists work for business or government and the economics profession is less 
integrated into public policy discussions. In fact, it’s a minority activity. It was very 
different in those days, it was most different at ANU, and I grew up in that tradition.2 
 
A pivotal meeting in Garnaut’s policy career occurred when he met Bob 
Hawke on the margins of the Crawford Committee on Structural Adjustment, of 
which Hawke was a member. This initial meeting eventually culminated in Garnaut 
being appointed as newly-installed Prime Minister Hawke’s principal economic 
adviser, a position he held from 1983-85. Significantly, Garnaut had written to both 
Hawke and Keating during the election campaign warning of the dangers of a fixed 
exchange rate and possible capital flight when they assumed office. The Hawke-
Keating government went on to implement a radical program of economic 
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liberalization that included floating the dollar, partially deregulating the financial 
sector, reducing tariffs and instituting labour market reform (Kelly 1992).  
 
While he may have had some influence on the thinking of Hawke and 
Keating, Garnaut believes they had already begun to move in this policy direction.  
Garnaut’s advice was influential not because of his entrepreneurial skills but because 
it chimed with, and gave intellectual credibility to, ideas that were circulating in 
Australia and internationally at the time (Ikenberry 1990). This was the era of 
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and the shift from a Keynesian paradigm to the 
monetarist revolution that would deeply affect the US and Britain. In retrospect, it 
was clear that given a sufficiently compelling historical ‘critical juncture’ a well-
packaged economic policy framework helped forge open a policy window capable of 
attracting significant political support from policymakers (Hall 1993). 
  
It is indicative of just how widespread the intellectual revolution of the 1980s 
actually was that it was the Australian Labor Party—hitherto associated with 
protectionism and the all-encompassing Australian settlement (Castles 1988)—that 
was at the forefront of epochal policy change rather than its Liberal opponents. In 
many respects, therefore, Garnaut was the right man in the right place at the right 
time: when the Hawke government wanted a framework and rationale for what would 
come to be known as ‘Asian engagement’, Garnaut was able to provide one.   
 
Australia and The Northeast Asian Ascendancy 
  
Several factors were clear by the time Garnaut was commissioned to write a 
report on ‘economic growth and structural change in the economies of East 
Asia…[and] to assess the effects of these recent and perspective developments on 
Australia’ (ANAA: v). East Asia’s rapid economic development and industrialization 
was transforming the region to Australia’s north. When Japan replaced the UK as 
Australia’s biggest trade partner in 1967 it was clear that momentous changes were 
underway. Japan’s economic renaissance provided the catalyst—and model—for a 
much wider, regional process of industrialization and growth. Although many 
academics and policymakers in Australia and the US may not have approved of, or 
even understood, Japan’s state-led model of development (Johnson 1982), it was 
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delivering results and transforming the region. Whether Australian policymakers liked 
it or not, they had little option other than to come to terms with a rapidly growing 
region. 
 
In preparation and behind the scenes, the ANAA consultation and drafting 
process performed a coordination function among the different policy circles and 
departments of Australian bureaucracy. On release, the ANAA was generally greeted 
with widespread acclaim and subsequently became the blueprint for Australia’s 
economic relations with the region. One of the most important differences between 
the 1980s and the current period with the ‘rise of China’ is that the Hawke-Keating 
governments were especially well-placed to push through fairly radical, potentially 
unpopular and disruptive reform. Without a permissive political environment and 
‘national mood’ of the sort that Hawke in particular had cultivated through the 
rhetoric of ‘consensus’, the far-reaching economic reforms he oversaw would have 
been much more difficult, perhaps unachievable (Beilharz 1994). 
 
Some of the ideas in ANAA were very confronting to established interests and 
perceptions of the time (Henry 2007: 95). The centerpiece of Garnaut’s 
recommendations was further, rapid trade liberalization and an abandonment of 
protectionism. The logic was impeccably neoclassical and based on assumed 
‘complementarity’ between the rapidly industrializing Asian economies and 
Australia’s resource riches. For some academics and much of the trade union 
movement this was an alarming prospect. The principal difference between then and 
now, however, was the close relationship between the government and organized 
labour, which might have been expected to be the main focus of resistance to the 
proposed reforms. The close ties between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) which had been most visible in the 
‘Accord’ were instrumental in limiting opposition to the proposed reforms. This 
outcome is all the more remarkable given the ACTU and organized labour were more 
powerful forces then than now, when membership, reputation and influence have 
declined significantly (Cooper 2008). 
 
Unions then, as now, were deeply concerned about the potential loss of 
manufacturing sector jobs that might flow from the abandonment of protection and 
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industry assistance. However, increases in the ‘social wage’, the inclusion of union 
leadership in the government-sponsored ‘peak’ bodies that oversaw the much 
discussed, and the widely perceived need for ‘structural adjustment’, all worked to 
minimize union opposition (Carney 1988). More predictably, business groups such as 
the Australian Chamber of Commerce and the National Farmers Federation were 
more enthusiastic backers of the ANAA’s proposals (Colebatch 1989: 21), even if the 
then Opposition industry spokesman John Howard was equivocal in offering his 
party’s support (Ecclestone 1989: 2).  Not only were those economic interests that 
might expect to benefit from Garnaut’s radical policy agenda broadly supportive, but 
the fact that the economically liberal blueprint was sponsored by an ALP government 
with strong and effective links to a potentially disruptive union movement meant that 
an potential source of opposition was effectively nullified. The ‘policy window’ was 
wedged open by the convergence of political, policy and problem streams, and 
notwithstanding sources of criticism on the reports’ release.3 Here, one of the key 
roles of experts and inquiries is to give intellectual credibility to ideas that may 
already be circulating, but which may be difficult to ‘sell’ to powerful vested 
interests, stakeholders or the public more generally. In this context, Garnaut’s 
academic authority and ‘objectivity’ lent useful political weight to proposals that 
might otherwise have attracted greater opposition. 
 
The ANAA appeared at a time when Australian policymakers were responding 
to broader shifts in the international economy that were having major domestic 
impacts—not the least of which was to highlight Australia’s perennial concerns about 
productivity and the appropriate role of government in managing a process of 
structural adjustment (Bell 1997). While domestic circumstances may have been 
receptive to what many have described as an essentially ‘neoliberal’ agenda, it is 
important to emphasize the paradoxical international dimensions of this process. On 
the one hand, the ALP’s adoption of a new market-oriented reform agenda was 
entirely in keeping with the international adoption of neoliberal ideas among the so-
called ‘Anglo-American’ economies (Hay 2004; Simmons et al 2006). On the other 
hand, despite Garanut’s policy ideas and the Hawke government being at the forefront 
of an even more ambitious agenda of foreign proselytization, their impact in the 




Although the ANAA was focused on domestic reform, it had major foreign 
policy implications that were actively developed by the Hawke government.   The 
principal vehicle through which the benefits of trade liberalization were to be realized 
at home and promoted abroad was the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum. Garnaut, along with his ANU colleague Peter Drysdale, had done more than 
most to promote the merits of trade liberalization and the institutionalization of 
regional cooperation (Drysdale and Garnaut 1989; 1993). APEC built upon an 
elaborate network of regional institutions, ‘track 2’ organizations and private-public 
links that might have been expected to facilitate the diffusion and implementation of 
the free trade agenda (Woods 1993). APEC’s increasing marginalization and even 
irrelevance among regional bodies suggests that Australia’s ‘policy community’ of 
like-minded scholars and decision-makers seriously underestimated the entrenched 
resistance to neoliberal ideas that existed in much of East Asia (Beeson and Islam 
2005). Indeed, APEC’s experience suggests that in the absence of supportive political 
coalitions and conditions, especially at the domestic level, policy change and the 
adoption of new ideas remains extremely difficult. In other words, local political 
interests and obstacles can prove decisive, even when there is an international 
environment which might otherwise appear conducive to change. Nothing better 




The climate change reviews 
 
As with ANAA, the first of Garnaut’s reports on climate change, the Garnaut 
Climate Change Review (GCGR 2008), was a seemingly timely response to an issue 
that had attracted increased attention, especially in the minds of the electorate. By the 
late 2000s the issue of climate change was nominated as a core concern among a 
majority of people in surveys of public opinion (Tranter 2011: 85; Lowy 2007). In 
other words, the national mood ought to have been conducive to effective policy-
making given that it was an issue that enjoyed widespread public support, and a 




Support for climate change policies has declined markedly over the last few 
years. This is one key reason that policy has proved so divisive, especially among 
political elites. There are particularly ‘Australian’ reasons for this development: 
Kevin Rudd’s notorious ‘back-flip’ on climate change mitigation; Julia Gillard’s 
broken promise on (not) imposing a carbon tax; and Tony Abbott’s determination to 
extract maximum political advantage from an issue that has become increasingly 
difficult for the incumbent government. All undermine the possibility of effective 
leadership on contentious issues. There are more fundamental issues at stake that go 
beyond the Australian case and illustrate why climate change represents what Garnaut 
(GCGR 2008: 287-89) described as a ‘diabolical problem’. 
 
The most intractable problem facing advocates of climate change mitigation 
strategies is that there is both an absence of consensus about what should be done, but 
there is also a continuing dispute about the nature—even the existence—of the 
problem. The scientific evidence is contested and politicized (Eichenbach and 
Eilperin 2011). The fractious debate around climate science is a dramatic contrast to 
the circumstances that surrounded ANAA.   
 
While there may have been widespread enthusiasm for economic reform and 
liberalization among policy elites in parts of ‘the West’, such ideas were not greeted 
with universal approbation. There is a continuing debate about what constitutes 
‘good’ economic policy, one with renewed urgency in the aftermath of   rolling global 
economic crises (Sachs 2011). Even when the ‘Washington consensus’ was at its most 
influential, it never enjoyed universal support as either a blueprint for action or an 
accurate diagnosis of empirical reality. Yet ANAA was largely adopted and its 
messages about trade liberalization, the limitations of ‘industry policy’ and the need 
to become more Asia literate have largely become the conventional rhetorical wisdom 
in Australia. 
 
Economics is a social science and a somewhat discredited one (Colander 
2011). ‘Climate scientists’, by contrast, operate in a rather more robust intellectual 
universe in which there is much greater agreement about ‘the facts’ and the way they 
are understood: 97-98 per cent of recognized climate scientists agreed on the basic 
causes of anthropogenic climate change and its likely consequences: global warming 
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(Andreeg et al 2010). Given such an overwhelming consensus one might have 
expected that Garnaut’s task in promoting climate change mitigation strategies would 
actually have been easier than convincing a ‘left wing’ government to overturn a 




The content of the first climate change review (GCGR 2008) was primarily a 
recapitulation of the conventional scientific wisdom. As Garnaut pointed out, ‘the 
outsider to climate science has no rational choice but to accept that, on a balance of 
probabilities, the mainstream science is right in pointing to high risks from 
unmitigated climate change’(GCGR 2008:xvii). At one level, Garnaut articulates the 
view of someone who has a fundamental belief in the power of scientific evidence 
and rational argument to arrive at the best policy outcome. On the other hand, GCGR 
2008 also recognized that this might not happen: 
 
Observation of daily debate and media discussion in Australia and elsewhere suggests 
that this issue might be too hard for rational policy making. It is too complex. The 
special interests are too numerous, powerful and intense. The time frames within 
which effects become evident are too long, and the time frames within which action 
must be effected too short. (GCGR 2008: xvii). 
 
The ‘vested interests’ that both Swan and Garnaut identified are not the only obstacles 
to enacting major policy change that will inevitably produce individual winners and 
losers over the short term political cycle.  In Australia and the US, there has been a 
systematic effort to discredit the scientific consensus and thus the need for climate 
change mitigations strategies that Garnaut advocates. There have been very different 
responses to the implications of climate change in Britain as a result of the Stern 
Review where media coverage has been relatively balanced5 and the US, where 
climate denial is a much more prominent in the political stream (Boykoff 2007).   
 
There are particular features of the Australian policy debate and political 
context that present particular challenges for those attempting to promote climate 
change mitigation. The Australian media is much smaller than its counterparts in the 
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US and the UK and the potential for the debate to be dominated by a limited number 
of voices and perspectives is consequently high.  In Robert Manne’s (2011: 113) 
view, ‘the Australian has conducted a prolonged and intellectually incoherent 
campaign against action on climate change, which has undermined the hold in public 
life of the central values of the Enlightenment, Science and Reason.’   
 
What is even more remarkable perhaps is the level of personal enmity 
displayed toward Garnaut (and public intellectuals like Manne).  The Australian’s 
foreign affairs editor suggested that: 
 
There is also something profoundly offensive to democratic practice in the way the 
Gillard government has shovelled out vast amounts of public money to long-term 
friends of the Labor Party, such as Garnaut and Tim Flannery, so that, with a wholly 
spurious and confected institutional credibility, they can declare: government good, 
opposition bad. (Sheridan 2011). 
  
Similarly, Andrew Bolt (2011) defended well-known climate skeptic, Christopher 
Monkton’s description of Garnaut as having a ‘fascist point of view’. Monkton 
became a minor YouTube sensation when he suggested during his ‘Lang Hancock 
Memorial Lecture’ that Australia’s mining magnates should use their economic power 
to create a Fox-News style channel to promote their political views (Manne 2012).  
 
Any remaining doubts Garnaut may have had about the possibility of having a 
rational, dispassionate debate about ‘the facts’ would have been dispelled by his 
exposure to ‘astroturfing’, or the creation of specific interest groups that are 
‘generated by an industry, think tank, or front group, but disguised to appear as 
spontaneous “grassroots” effort’ (Dunlap and McRight 2011: 154). Stage-managed 
public outrage and abuse are becoming a  part of the Australian political process.  As 
Garnaut notes, despite the widespread belief that the new social media can be 
empowering and open up the political process to new participants, it can also be used 
to ‘warp the public policy discussion’.6 Not only was climate change mitigation 
dependent on overcoming powerful political obstacles  (a more prominent feature of 
GR 2011), the policy window was opened to wider societal input, diluting the impact 




One of the features of GR 2011 is the emphasis on equity and the increased 
recognition of the importance of the international context in trying to impose the 
carbon taxes or an emissions trading scheme. Whereas the international context 
provided critical ideational momentum and support for ANAA in the early 1990s, in 
the first part of the twenty-first century the situation was very different. Not only had 
there been a spectacular failure of international cooperation and consensus at the 
Copenhagen climate change talks, but key countries such as the United States 
appeared to have given up on the possibility of enacting meaningful policy in the face 
of powerful domestic opposition (Timmons 2011).  
 
Although Garnaut is at pains to emphasize that some countries, such as China, 
(and even large American states) are addressing the issue, the more nuanced anti-
mitigation argument contends that even if the science is correct, why should Australia 
impose painful domestic costs that penalize consumers and producers if they make 
little difference to global outcomes? This is essentially the position developed by 
Tony Abbott (2011) and used as the justification for repealing the carbon tax 
legislation. Given the complex, contentious nature of the evidence and the policy 
response, it is unsurprising that it has proved very difficult to achieve consensus, 
when powerful political forces contest expert opinion.  By contrast, the political 
context of ANAA was one where Australian interests could be rallied around a 
persuasive narrative of economic reform, and where sovereign policy making could 




Making a judgment about the impact of policy entrepreneurs also involves 
taking a position on the perennial debate about the relationship between structure and 
agency, the domestic and the international, and whether it is ideas, institutions or 
interests that set policy agendas. The multiple streams model can accommodate these 
debates. However, most analyses of the policy entrepreneur have tended to stress the 
agency and effectiveness of the policy entrepreneur operating from the policy stream.  
Such analysis is often in the abstract, assuming that policy entrepreneurs are in 
possession of high standing or strong expert credentials; applications to real 
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individuals are relatively rare.7 Our focus on the differential impact of the various 
Garnaut reports seeks to provide an antidote by stressing contextual factors, especially 
the intricacies of the specific problem and the overwhelming forces flowing from the 
political stream whereby reception to (social) science can be used to bolster (or 
deflect) policy change rather than to inform policy. Ken Henry describes this dynamic 
more benignly as the need for economic policy advisors to be “responsive to the 
government of the day” (2007: 90).  
 
In our case studies it is evident that structures continue to matter.  In the case 
of the environment, the structure of the biosphere may, as the Marxists used to say, 
actually prove to be determinative ‘in the last instance’. Even in the slightly less 
existentially fraught economic sphere, it is plain that long-term ‘structural’ crises in 
the global economy opened up an ideational and political space in which new ideas 
were actively sought, and new policies implemented. . 
 
The key difference between Garnaut’s climate change injunctions and those 
associated with economic reform was that even those who doubted the wisdom of his 
economic policy prescriptions conceded that they were supposed to be in the long-
term ‘national interest’. Via ANAA, Garnaut was not only able to ‘attach a set of 
solutions to a problem’ but also to effectively frame the problem in ways that 
accorded with the vested interests of business and the unions in Australia.  With 
climate change, the principal beneficiaries will be the unborn or the unfortunate and 
unknown outside Australia.8 Selling that idea in the face of an incredulous media, a 
hostile political opposition and powerful vested interests will tax the powers of even 
the most entrepreneurial of idea brokers.  
 
Are there lessons about policy entrepreneurship? First, ANAA reveals that individual 
epistemic authority is important to gearing policy reform but also that of the policy 
network and professional community that undergirds and bestows credibility on 
entrepreneurs. Second, ANAA represented a consolidation of policy trajectories 
already extant in the policy stream.  Despite on-going debate, a set of solutions were 
recognized in both the policy and political streams but which needed further 
legitimation and promotion. The ANAA helped facilitate that policy coordination 
linking the solutions from the policy stream with the reform agenda of Labor 
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government political stream. Third, the policy issues and problems surrounding ANAA 
were ones which a government could engage in effective decision making and action 
at a national level. The Accord promoted a positive ‘national mood’ in the political 
stream providing the window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs like Garnaut 
(and others) to cross between their facilitation roles among government departments, 
academia and various dialogues and networks to move into the public realm as policy 
advisors. In short, dynamics in the political stream make policy entrepreneurship 
successful (or not).     
 
By contrast, in the Climate Reviews, Garnaut lacked the same degree of scientific 
experience and credibility that he had as an economist and Asia expert with ANAA. 
More importantly, entrenched dissent and division in the political stream, 
compounded by a hostile media, politicized climate science and polarized the 
community. The problem definition and agenda setting roles of policy entrepreneurs 
working from the policy stream (Skok, 1995), even those afforded governmental 
patronage, are unlikely to overcome powerful oppositionary forces in the political 
stream seeking to contest and thwart the next steps of decision making, policy 
coordination and implementation.  Lastly, there is a growing literature that highlights 
the possible absence of solutions to the climate change problem (Hamilton, 2010). It 
sets the climate issue apart in terms of its world-wide impact that is beyond the scope 
of sovereign policy control of any one nation and hence its innate political 







                                                 
1 We would like to thank Andrew Carr and Will Lee for research assistance, the 
reviewers of AJPS for helpful comments, and Ross Garnaut. 
 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes from Garnaut are drawn from an interview 
conducted by one author. 
 
3 See, for example, the collection of essays in the special issue of the Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, 1990, 44 (1). 
 
4 As Shaun Carney (2011) points out, as recently as the 2007 election, ‘the Liberals, 
the Labor Party and the Greens all went to a federal election advocating quick action 
to put a price on carbon. Together, they attracted 87 per cent of the primary vote.’ 
 
5 The Stern review was also conducted by a professional economist rather than a 
climate scientist in the belief that a focus on the economic impacts of climate change 
might prove a bigger impetus for mitigation policies. To judge by the more positive 
response to Stern’s report in the UK and its translation into policy, this judgment may 
have some merit, but the less partisan political atmosphere and more balanced media 




7 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the same sort of analysis could usefully be 
applied to Hugh White’s efforts to influence the debate over Australia’s strategic 
policy. We also note that a comparison to Henry report on the ‘Asian Century’ would 











Abbott, T. (2011) 'Garnaut's report revealing the true costs of a Gillard carbon tax'. 
The Daily Telegraph June 02. 
 
Achenbach, J. and J. Eilperin (2011) ‘Climate-change science makes for hot politics.’ 
Washington Post. August 20. 
 
 
Anderegg, William R L; James W. Prall, Jacob Harold, and Stephen H. Schneider, 
(2010) ‘Expert credibility in climate change’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science, 107 (27): 12107–9  
19 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Beeson, M. and Islam, I. (2005) 'Neo-liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the 
Washington Consensus', Journal of Development Studies 41(2): 197-219. 
 
Bell, S. (1997) Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy of Australian 
Economic Policy, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press). 
 
Bell, S. (2011) ‘Do we really need a new “constructivist institutionalism” to explain 
institutional change?’, British Journal of Political Science 41(04): 883-906. 
 
Beilharz, P. (1994) Transforming Labor: Labour Tradition and the Labor Decade in 
Australia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Bolt, A. (2011) 'Bid to quiet sceptic reeks of hypocrisy'. The Sunday Mail June 26. 
 
Boykoff, M.T. (2007) 'Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic 
climate change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006', 
Area 39(4): 470-481. 
 
Carney, S. (1988) Australia in Accord: Politics and Industrial Relations Under the 
Hawke Government, (Melbourne: Sun Books). 
 
Carney, S. (2011) 'The death of the reform era'. The Age July 13. 
 
Capoccia, G. and Kelemen, R.D. (2007) 'The study of critical junctures: Theory, 
narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism', World Politics, 
59(April): 341-369. 
 
Castles, F.G. (1988) Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability: a 
comparative and historical perspective, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin). 
 
Colander, D. (2011) 'How economists got it wrong: A nuanced account', Critical 
Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 23(1): 1 - 27. 
 
Colebatch, Tim (1989) ‘Battle lines drawn over restructuring proposals’, The Age, 
November 23. 
 
Cooper, R. and Ellem, B. (2008) 'The neoliberal state, trade unions and collective 
bargaining in Australia', British Journal of Industrial Relations 46(3): 532-
554. 
 
Dunlap, R.E. and McRight, A.M. (2011) 'Organized climate change denial', in, J.S. Dryzek, 
R.B. Norgaard and D. Schlosberg The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and 
Society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press):144-160. 
 
 
Drysdale, P. and Garnaut, R. (1989) A Pacific Free Trade Area?, vol. 171. (Canberra: 




                                                                                                                                            
Drysdale, P. and Garnaut, R. (1993) 'The Pacific: An application of a general theory 
of economic integration', in, C.F. Bergsten and M. Noland Pacific Dynamism 
and the International Economic System, (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics):183-223. 
 
Ecclestone, Roy (1989) ‘Opposition holds back on tariffs’, The Australian, November 
24. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. (2006) ‘Introduction’, in Amitai Etzioni (ed.) Are Public 
Intellectuals and Endangered Species? (Lanham Maryland, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers Inc).  
 
Garnaut, R. (ANAA, 1990) Australia and the Northeast Ascendancy, (Canberra: A.G.P.S.). 
 
Garnaut, R. (GCGR, 2008). The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report. 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Garnaut, R. (GR, 2011). The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response 
to Climate Change. (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Gulbrandsson, Karin & Fossum, Bjöörn (2009), An exploration of the theoretical 
concepts policy windows and policy entrepreneurs at the Swedish public 
health arena, Health Promotion International,   24(4): 434-44.  
 
Gyngell, Allan (2007) Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute). 
 
Hall, P.A. (1993) 'Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of 
economic policymaking in Britain', Comparative Politics 25(3): 275-296. 
 
Hamilton, C. (2010) Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change, 
(London: Earthscan). 
 
Hay, C. (2004) 'The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional 
embedding of neoliberalism', Economy and Society 33(4): 500-527. 
 
Henry, Ken. (2007) ‘Challenges Confronting Economic Policy Advisors’, Public 
Policy, 2(2): 89-98.  
 
Hoeijmakers, M., E. De Leeuw, P. Kenis & N.K. de Vries (2007) Local health policy 
development processes in the Netherlands: an expanded toolbox for health 
promotion.  Health Promotion International, 22 (2) 112-121. 
 
Howe, Irving. (2006) ‘Intellectuals, Dissent and Bureaucrats’, in Amitai Etzioni (ed.) 
Are Public Intellectuals and Endangered Species? Lanham Maryland, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 
 
Ikenberry, G.J. (1990) 'The international spread of privatization policies: 
Inducements, learning, and “policy bandwagoning”’, in, E.N. Sueiman and J. 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Waterbury The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 88-110. 
 
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industry Policy 
1925-1975, (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
 
Jordan, A. and Lorenzoni, I. (2007) 'Is there now a political climate for policy 
change? Policy and politics after the Stern Review', The Political Quarterly 
78(2): 310-319. 
 
Kelly, P. (1992) The end of certainty: the story of the 1980s, (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: 
Allen & Unwin). 
 
Kingdon, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies . NY: Harper 
Collins. Second edition: New York: Longman. Second ed., 1995.  
 
Mackenzie, C. (2004): Policy entrepreneurship in Australia: a conceptual 
review and application, Australian Journal of Political Science, 39:2, 367-386 
 
Manne, R. (2011) 'Bad news: Murdoch’s Australian and the shaping of the nation', 
Quarterly Essay 431-119. 
 
Manne, R. (2012) 'Lord Monckton and the Future of Australian Media'. The Monthly 
8 February. 
 
Mintrom, Michael and Norman, Phillipa. (2009) ‘Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy 
Change’, Policy Studies Journal 37: 649-667. 
 
Oborn, E., Barrett, M. and Exworthy, M. (2011), ‘Policy entrepreneurship in the 
Development of Public Sector Strategy: The Case of London Health Reform’, 
Public Administration, 89: 325–344. 
 
Sachs, J. (2011) 'The great failure of globalisation'. Financial Times August 17. 
 
Sheridan, G. (2011) 'Truth is that Garnaut is partisan'. The Australian June 16. 
 
Skok, J. E. (1995) Policy issue networks and the public policy cycle: A structural-
functional framework for public administration, Public Administration 
Review 55 (4) 325-332.  
 
Stone, Diane. (2007) ‘Garbage Cans, Recycling Bins or Think Tanks? Three Myths 
about Policy Institutes’, Public Administration, 85(2): 259-278.  
 
Swan, W. (2012) 'The 0.01 per cent: The rising influence of vested interests in 
Australia'. The Monthly March 2. 
 
Timmons, R., J. (2011) 'Multipolarity and the new world (dis)order: US hegemonic 
decline and the fragmentation of the global climate regime', Global 
Environmental Change 21(3): 776-784. 
22 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Tranter, B. (2011) ‘Political divisions over climate change and environmental issues 
in Australia’, Environmental Politics, 20:1, pp.78-96. 
 
Woods, L. (1993) Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Relations, (Vancouver: UBC Press). 
 
